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This thesis deals with the question whether the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the 
ICJ) has the competence to carry out a judicial review of the United Nations Security Council’s 
(hereinafter the SC) resolutions. The following is the problem of this thesis. The SC has been 
given almost unlimited range of powers to adopt resolutions regarding matters related to 
international peace and security, but there is no clear power for a court to carry out a judicial 
review over the resolutions. This could lead to violations of rights of the people influenced by 
these resolutions and them being deprived of a possibility to protect their rights in a judicial 
institution. 
 
This thesis concentrates on the possibility of judicial review in the ICJ as the resolutions could 
have influence on countries that for example do not belong to the European Union (hereinafter 
the EU) and therefore an international court needs to have this type of power. The purpose of 
this thesis is to identify whether the ICJ could have the competence to carry out a judicial review 
over the SC resolutions. This is analyzed through the example of the resolutions that were 
adopted against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter the DPRK) in 2017 
and 2018 (hereinafter collectively the Resolutions). The purpose is not to conclude whether 
these resolutions were, in fact, legal or illegal, but conclude whether the possible issues could 
be dealt with in the ICJ. 
 
The starting point for this master thesis is that there are no clear legal grounds for reviewing the 
legality of the SC’s resolutions in the ICJ. Although there have been some cases where ICJ has 
given opinions and instructions regarding the competence of reviewing the actions of the SC, 
there are still divergent understandings regarding this matter amongst lawyers. However, the 
hypothesis of this thesis is that the ICJ has the competence to exercise judicial review of the 
SC’s resolutions. This hypothesis has been set because as the ICJ is the closest judicial organ 
to the SC regarding the territorial aspect and global system of the UN, it could be the most 
competent court to carry out the judicial review. 
 
Globalization in nowadays’ society is mainly heard in the context of business and culture but it 
can actually be seen in law as well. Namely, as the biggest and most influential decisions of 
today’s world politics are made by international authorities and they are considered to reflect 
the standings of the whole world it is clear that the importance and relevance of these 
organizations has rapidly increased. Thus, it has become more topical than ever to question how 
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these global organizations work, whether their actions are lawful and entail the parties to act in 
accordance with their statements. Especially due to the importance of security matters it is even 
more important to question the actions taken by organs that deal with these matters. 
 
In the course of the San Francisco Conference in 1945 the SC was given remarkable 
responsibilities regarding international security matters. According to Article 24 of the UN 
Charter1 (hereinafter Charter) the SC has the main responsibility in the area of peace and 
security in the UN and in carrying out these responsibilities the SC acts on behalf of the entire 
UN membership.2 In order to fulfil its obligations the SC was given a wide range of powers to 
make decisions regarding usually the most politically important security issues from all parts 
of the world that influence different countries and their peoples. 
 
After the establishment of the SC there have been a number of discussions regarding the limits 
of the actions taken by the SC, inter alia the review of legality of the SC’s resolutions. 73 years 
ago the Member States of the United Nations (hereinafter Member States) did not specify in 
the Charter what are the legal restrictions to the action of the SC and whether there is an 
institution that consistently carries out supervision over the actions taken by the SC or has the 
right to review the legality of the decisions by the SC to secure that there is no misuse of power. 
Although it may therefore seem that the SC has unlimited power to decide what course of action 
to take to fulfil its responsibilities, it is widely recognized by different authorities3 that the SC 
is not, in fact, the supreme institution4. 
 
Several concerns have been raised regarding the powers of the SC. Firstly, many are worried 
that the SC is a body with a growing power and dominated by only a few states without any 
control5, but too much of one power is not welcomed because the gross potentiality of misuse6. 
                                                   
1 The Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco: 26.06.1945 – http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-
nations/index.html. 
2 A. Orakhelashvili. Collective Security. New York: Oxford University Press 2011, p 22. 
3 I. Hurd. The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law. – The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics. 2014, p 15. 
4 R. Wolfrum. 12th Commission on Judicial Control of Security Council Decisions (UNO). Yearbook of Institute 
of International Law. Tallinn Session 2015. Volume 76, p 417. 
5 I. Rajčić. Legal Control over Decisions Taken by the UN organs and Judicial Review of the SC Decisions. 2014, 
p 109. 




Due to the wide margin of discretion of the SC members in general and the five permanent 
members in particular a major concern has been expressed that the SC’s decisions reflect the 
scenario of international relations and diplomatic interactions between members of the 
international community and this, in turn, suggests that the actions taken by the SC are tainted 
by selection bias.7 The only real limit to the powers seem to be that the resolutions do not either 
receive enough votes or are vetoed. 
 
Secondly, the measures taken by the SC, and especially against individuals and entities in the 
form of targeted sanctions, have been criticized for violating internationally protected human 
rights such as the right to property, right to free movement and the right to privacy. Moreover, 
it has been argued that the system of targeted sanctions is violating the right to fair trial since 
the addressees do not have sufficient means to challenge the facts and assumptions on which 
their designation as being associated with terrorism was based.8 Moreover, even when the 
targeted sanctions were not developed the sanctions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
that imposed sanctions on States, the rights of individuals or groups of individuals of such a 
State are not directly affected, even though the indirect effect of such sanctions on the 
population of the targeted States has been also criticized by human rights bodies.9 
 
All of the abovementioned concerns have put the involved parties in front of many questions, 
which concern the legality of the SC’s resolutions and ultimately lead the to the need to review 
whether the resolutions made by the SC are lawful or not and whether they should therefore be 
followed or not. However, the solution to this problem could lie within the question whether 
the other institutions of the collective security system – the General Assembly (hereinafter GA) 
and ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN – have or should have the power to exercise 
control over the SC and its resolutions. Although the drafters of the Charter assumed that the 
SC would be making its own judgments on legal issues that might arise in its work, and did not 
find it necessary to give these authorities any right of review of the SC’s decisions,10 the 
                                                   
7 R. Deplano. The Use of International Law by the United Nations Security Council: an Empirical Framework for 
Analysis. – Emory International Law Review. Volume 29. 2015., p 2097. 
8 B. Fassbender. Targeted Sanctions and Due Process. Study Commissioned by the United Nations. Office of Legal 
Affairs 2006. 
9 R. Wolfrum, supra fn 4, p 420. 
10 M. J. Matheson. ICJ Review of Security Council Decisions. – George Washington International Law Review. 




possibility has been widely discussed not only in theory, but even the ICJ itself has discussed 
its competence. The standings will be dealt with in this thesis as well. 
 
In a typical judicial dispute where the parties are not able to reach an agreement an independent 
third party like a court or a mediator is involved, but there is no specific regulation for this in 
terms of the SC’s resolutions either in the Charter or the International Court of Justice’s 
Statute11 (hereinafter Statute). Having a third party involved in a legal issue is said to have a 
good influence in solving a conflict through peaceful means. An international court having the 
competence to exercise supervision over the SC could be the solution to the concerns that have 
been raised regarding the SC but this also needs to have legal grounds. Especially, after the 
Lockerbie12 cases in the ICJ the judicial review of the SC’s resolutions by the ICJ has become 
under the attention of the international community. 
 
As the SC adopts several resolutions every month, but there is no clear view regarding the 
possibility to execute judicial review over these resolutions, the problem remains actual. 
Moreover, the competence has been widely discussed in legal literature and there have been a 
few instances where the judicial institutions have expressed their standings regarding whether 
this possibility exists or should be provided. This thesis is built upon the most recent document 
that has been compiled regarding the jurisdiction of the ICJ having carrying out a judicial 
review over the SC’s resolution, which is Rüdiger Wolfrum’s Report on the 12th Commission 
on Judicial Control of Security Council Decisions (UNO). 
 
Moreover, the author analyses several other legal scholars opinions on this matter and 
additionally brings out the most important statements from the relevant case law. The analysis 
is carried out using the resolutions that were adopted against the DPRK and using the inductive 
method concluding whether the ICJ could review these resolutions and therefore has the 
competence. This thesis uses a new angle to review this question due to the fact that it carries 
out an analysis of through the example of adopted resolutions towards the DPRK in order to 
detect what are the practical aspects of reviewing resolutions. Among other things, the author 
                                                   
11 The Statute of the International Court of Justice. – http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute. 
12 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom). Preliminary Objections. ICJ 
Reports. 1998; Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States). Preliminary Objections. 




detects what are the 6  elements of judicial review is case of the SC’s Resolutions and conclude 
whether the judicial review in ICJ would therefore be achievable.13 
 
In order to conclude whether the ICJ can carry out a judicial review over the SC’s resolutions 
this thesis has been divided into 6 chapters, which firstly detect the mechanism of adopting the 
resolutions and what are the legal aspects regarding it and secondly detect the mechanism of 
solving potential disputes over the SC’s resolutions in the ICJ. The first chapter sets out the 
basis and purpose of the competence of the SC to be a decision-making body. The second 
chapter analyses the mechanism of adopting resolutions and analyses the sanctions posed with 
the Resolutions adopted against the DPRK. The third chapter sets out what laws and principles 
the SC has to follow when taking action and what are the possible legal difficulties with the 
Resolutions. The fourth chapter analyses the competence of the ICJ to evaluate the aspects of 
the SC’s Resolutions that were brought out in the first three chapters. The fifth chapter sets out 
the elements of the disputes in the ICJ and whether they are fulfilled regarding the Resolutions. 
The sixth chapter sets out what is or could be the outcome of reviewing the resolutions of the 
SC in the ICJ.  
                                                   
13 According to Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad the judicial review usually includes the following elements: the decision-
making body; the nature or general class or category of the act or decision; grounds of nullity and other legal 
difficulties with the act or decision; the tribunal of review; the parties before the tribunal or court; nature and effect 
of the court’s decision. (K. H. Kaikobad. The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review. A Study of the 




1.  THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AS A DECISION-
MAKING BODY 
 
Every case of judicial review firstly involves a decision and therefore there always exists a 
decision-making body. The UN comprises of different bodies that have the power to adopt 
decisions. However, the SC and the GA are the two principal organs that constitute the most 
important decision-making bodies in the contemporary international legal system.14 This 
chapter focuses on the SC as a decision-making body analyzing the legal basis of the SC to 
have this kind of power and how the SC adopts its resolutions, which is necessary in order to 
detect the competence of the SC and determine the legal nature of its actions.  
 
There is no doubt that there exists legal framework that gives the SC the right to adopt decisions. 
The operation of the SC is mainly regulated by the three following sources: the UN Charter, the 
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council15 and Note S/2017/507 by the President 
of the Security Council16. These sources give the SC the legal basis for existing and operating 
in the international field. Chapter V-VIII and XII of the Charter lay out the purpose and general 
working mechanisms of the SC, while the Provisional Rules and the Note by the President are 
more specified guidelines regulating how the SC has to adopt its decisions. Therefore, these 
sources lay out the technical aspects on how the SC needs to adopt its decisions and could be 
regarded as the procedural regulation of the SC’s actions. 
 
The Charter confers the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security on the SC for the purpose of ensuring fast and effective action by the UN.17 To carry 
out this responsibility the SC has been given a decision-making power. According to Article 39 
of the Charter, the SC shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken by Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. The SC has 
the right to make recommendations and decisions to tackle situations that jeopardize the world 
peace. Moreover, the Charter gives the SC the right to firstly, determine whether there even 
                                                   
14 K. H. Kaikobad, supra fn 13, p 33. 
15 The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. United Nations. New York: 1983. 
16 Note S/2017/507 by the President of the Security Council. United Nations. 30.08.2017. 
17 B. Simma (ed), H. Mosler, A. Randelzhofer, C. Tomuschat, R. Wolfrum and others. The Charter of the United 




exists a security issue and a need to respond to it internationally and secondly, decide what 
could be the appropriate measures to solve this issue. 
 
Additionally, the Charter states what are the purpose and primary responsibility of the SC. 
There have been wide discussion on the different interpretations of  “the primary 
responsibility”18, but it is clear that the SC has the right to make decisions in its discretion to 
maintain the international peace and security. This is the most important purpose that an organ 
has in the international field and therefore the SC has an immense responsibility to fulfil. This 
could also be one of the reasons why the decisions of the SC often involve drastic measures, 
which bring about significant influence to the addressees. There are great expectations towards 
the SC and its important role on the international level and the SC acts in pursuance of fulfilling 
these expectations and securing the safety of the entire world. 
 
In order to adopt resolutions the SC has a panel of representatives of the Member States. This 
panel consists of ten non-permanent members that are elected by the GA for a term of two years 
and five permanent members – the United States of America, Russia, the Republic of China, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France – who have the right to 
veto a resolution. 
 
In case an important issue regarding peace and security has emerged somewhere in the world 
the SC calls upon a meeting with its members to address the international concern and discuss 
the standing of the SC. Although the SC adopts its decisions according to a procedure set out 
in the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the SC and the Charter and the resolutions are adopted 
through voting, in nature this decision-making procedure is still a complex negotiation between 
the Member States in order to reach a standing in a certain matter.19 Although the resolutions 
are not formally designated as treaties, they are still agreements on which the Member States 
concerned can place reliance.20 
 
 
                                                   
18 B. Simma (ed) and J. Delbrück, supra fn 17, p 445-449. 
19 A. Orakhelashvili, supra fn 3, p 39. 




The Resolutions that are under review regarding the topic of this thesis were an outcome of the 
SC using its decision-making power. In 2017 the SC adopted 5 resolutions21 against the DPRK 
and in 2018 the SC has adopted 1 resolution22 against the DPRK so far. Therefore, the first 
element of judicial review regarding the Resolutions, the decision-making body23, is the United 
Nations Security Council.  
                                                   
21 S/RES/2345. The United Nations Security Council. 7904th Meeting of the United Nations Security Council. 
23.03.2017 – http://undocs.org/S/RES/2345(2017); S/RES/2356. The United Nations Security Council. 7958th 
Meeting of the United Nations Security Council. 02.06.2017 – http://undocs.org/S/RES/2356(2017); S/RES/ 2371. 
The United Nations Security Council. 8019th Meeting of the United Nations Security Council.  05.08.2017 – 
http://undocs.org/S/RES/2371(2017); S/RES/2375. The United Nations Security Council. 8042nd Meeting of the 
United Nations Security Council. 11.09.2017 - http://undocs.org/S/RES/2375(2017); S/RES/2397. The United 
Nations Security Council. 8151st Meeting of the United Nations Security Council. 22.12.2017. – 
http://undocs.org/S/RES/2397(2017). 
22 S/RES/2407. The United Nations Security Council. 8210th Meeting of the United Nations Security Council. 
21.03.2018. – http://undocs.org/S/RES/2407(2018). 
23 K. H. Kaikobad, supra fn 13, p 33-34. 
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2.  THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL 
 
There are 3 layers of the decision made by the SC. The first layer consists of the decision of the 
SC under Article 39 Charter that something constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.24  On the second layer, the SC decides which sanctions are to be taken. Both of the 
decisions have a predominantly standard setting character since in the context of targeted 
sanctions they are not directly implementable as long as the list of individuals or entities does 
not specify against whom they are to be addressed.25 On the third layer, the SC needs to identify 
the persons and entities to be listed with the view that the sanctions decided upon by the SC on 
the 2nd layer be applied against them. Member States are obliged under the S/RES 
1267/1989/2253 system to make such nominations, but it is for them to decide whom to identify 
and what to produce as the basis for such designation.26 
 
This chapter focuses on the resolutions that the SC has the power to adopt, analyzing the 
adoption of resolutions and stating what the Resolutions have imposed on the addressees. This 
chapter is divided in to two subchapters. The first deals with the nature of the decisions of the 
SC and the mechanism of the 3 layers of adopting resolutions of the SC. The second deals with 
the Resolutions that were adopted against the DPRK and the imposed sanctions on the State, 
individuals and entities. This is done in order to establish what is the second element of judicial 
review, the nature of the act or decision27 in case of the Resolutions. Judicial review could only 
be carried out in case there is an act or decision that could be reviewed, therefore it its necessary 
for this chapter to set out how the SC adopts its resolutions and what they include. Moreover, 
to detect what the Resolutions impose on the parties, so that the accordance with necessary 
requirements for the them could be reviewed later on. 
 
 
                                                   
24 R. Wolfrum, supra fn 4, p 455-456. 
25 Ibid, p 455-456. 
26 Ibid, p 455-456. 
27 K. H. Kaikobad, supra fn 13, p 34-35 
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2.1. The Nature and Adoption Mechanism of the Resolutions of the United Nations 
Security Council 
The nature of the act or decision adopted by the SC sets out how the act has been adopted and 
what the consequences to the addressees are. The set of rules mentioned in the previous chapter 
allows the SC to adopt a variety of decisions, including resolutions, Presidential Statements, 
notes by the SC President, press statements and letters from the SC President that all have a 
different type of effect on the addressees. This subchapter detects what the legal nature of the 
resolutions is, how they are adopted and what they can impose in order to carry out an analysis 
on the Resolutions in the second subchapter. 
 
When the Charter was created, the creation of binding decision-making power for the 
organization, or the SC respectively, was to be the core element of the concept of the UN 
organization.28 According  to Article 25 of the Charter the SC has the authority to adopt binding 
decisions. However, it was affirmed in the Namibia29 case that Article 25 makes the SC’s 
decisions binding, whether they are adopted under Chapter VII or not. Moreover, as the binding 
nature of the decisions has been widely analyzed, it has also been found that the decisions taken 
under Chapter VII, which are not couched in terms of recommendation, and decisions under 
Chapter VIII, are both binding under Article 25.30 The binding nature of decisions is derived 
from the agreement brought out in Article 25 of the Charter, which states that the members have 
to accept and carry out the decisions of the SC.31 
 
From the abovementioned list of actions the SC can adopt, the resolutions are recognized as the 
type of SC decision endowed with the greatest political relevance. This is believed because the 
resolutions must be obeyed by the UN Member States 32, which means that in nature they are 
binding on the parties involved and therefore bring about certain consequences to the addressees 
and possibly the other parties involved. Although the Charter itself does not give the definition 
of a resolution, they are differentiated from other acts by their binding nature. Therefore, the 
second element of judicial review regarding the Resolutions, the nature of the act or decision, 
                                                   
28 B. Simma (ed) and J. Delbrück, supra fn 17, p 454. 
29 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). Advisory Opinion. ICJ Reports. 1971, p 53. 
30 B. Simma (ed) and J. Delbrück, supra fn 17, p 457. 
31 Ibid, p 458. 




is a binding nature.33 Since 1946 when the SC was created, it has adopted 2410 resolutions 
towards the Member States and therefore it has had a significant influence of the Member 
States. 
 
The resolutions themselves usually consist of two main parts: a preamble and an operative part. 
The preamble describes the events that have taken place and the concerns that these events have 
raised in the SC. Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter regulate what the possible measures that 
would help the SC to restore the peace and security are. The operative part states what are the 
measures that are to be taken in order to address these concerns and restore the peace and 
security. The operative part can also be divided into two different parts. The first part states the 
general sanctions that mainly influence the whole economy of the State. The second part states 
the concrete sanctions on individuals and entities, which are also known as targeted or “smart“ 
sanctions and have been established since the late 1990s to tackle problems more effectively 
and hit only those who are responsible for the breach, not the innocent bystanders.34 
Additionally, the resolutions have annexes that list the individuals and entities that will be the 
addressees of the targeted sanctions. 
 
Therefore, the primary emphasis of the resolutions lies in the sanctions that it imposes on the 
addressees and that the Member States have to cooperate to carry them out effectively. Due to 
the Cold War that took place 1947-1991, only a few sanctions were adopted before 1990. For 
example, the only ones regarding the DPRK were related to the Korean war, but many others 
were also associated with wars, and therefore they were mainly military sanctions that sought 
to solve war situations in different parts of the world. 
 
Originally the sanctions of the SC were directed against particular Member States while 
addressing the Member States or only a group thereof to implement the sanctions.35 Due to the 
growing involvement of non-state groups in conflicts to which the Security Council 
increasingly turned its attention to it modified its practice, but did not develop a clear pattern.36 
                                                   
33 K. H. Kaikobad, supra fn 13, p 34-35. 
34 L. Kanji. Moving Targets. The Evolution and Future of Smart Sanctions. – Harvard International Review. 
04.01.2017. – http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14138; B. Simma (ed) and N. Krisch, supra fn 17, p 738. 
35 R. Wolfrum, supra fn 4, p 439. 
36 N. Melzer. Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 




It increasingly directed its sanctions against non-state actors alone or together with particular 
Member States.37 The forerunners of targeted sanctions were meant to establish or to restate 
substantive obligations for particular groups whereas targeted sanctions require the addressed 
Member States to implement sanctions against particular individuals or groups; they also 
emphasized that also non-state entities may have obligations under public international law and 
from there to take enforcement measures against such groups is just an additional step. 38 The 
number of non-military sanctions increased after the Cold War and in this process the sanctions 
system has undergone significant changes and refinement, which finally led to targeted 
sanctions against particular individuals or groups.39 However, this does not mean that sanctions 
against Member States as such have become obsolete. 
  
The objective of the sanction concerned varies. Sanctions may intend to coerce the addressee 
constrain it or send a signal; however, targeted sanctions mainly may have the further objective 
to prevent certain activities. Although all non-military sanctions ultimately aim at influencing 
the behaviour of individuals, albeit by addressing Member States, targeted sanctions modify 
this approach.40 The latter specifically target named individuals or entities involved in armed 
conflict, terrorism, systematic and widespread violations of human rights as well as 
international crimes, all qualified as threats to peace and security, with the objective to make 
them comply with international law in general or with adopted SC resolutions; however, in 
respect of military sanctions the SC has to seek the co-operation of Member States willing to 
engage militarily.41 
 
There are different measures that the sanctions entail. Article 41 of the Charter states that the 
SC may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the UN to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
                                                   
37 R. Wolfrum, supra fn 4, p 439. 
38 R. Wolfrum, supra fn, p 439-440. 
39 D. Cortright, G. A. Lopez and L. Gerber. Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action. 2002; 
D. Cortright and G. Lopez (eds). Smart Sanctions. Towards Effective and Humane Sanctions Reform. 2002; D. 
Cortright and G. A. Lopez. Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat. 2007; G. C. Hufbauer, J. Schott, K. Elliott 
and B. Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 3rd expanded edition. Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. 2009; A. Charon. UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats. London and 
New York: Routledge 2010. 





postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations. Should the SC consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate 
or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the 
UN. But in order to impose military measures, the SC must consider non-military enforcement 
measures to be, or to have been, inadequate. This does not mean that it is necessary to order 
and implement non-military measures prior, but rather that they have to be considered and 
deemed not effective.42 
 
The abovementioned implies that the sanctions imposed by the SC have ranged from 
comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more targeted measures such as arms 
embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions.43  These are the most typical 
and widely used sanctions in the SC’s resolutions but there are many more types.44 As it is left 
to the discretion of the SC, which measures will be the most effective in order to restore and 
maintain the peace and security of countries the range of sanctions that have been imposed is 
wide. The SC has applied different sanctions to support peaceful transitions, deter non-
constitutional changes, constrain terrorism, protect human rights and promote non-
proliferation.  
 
In order to administer each sanctions regime adopted by the SC better and secure that the 
sanctions are targeted carefully and adequately, the SC has established sanctions committees 
and delegated several of its responsibilities to them.45 Each sanctions committee is tailored to a 
particular sanctions regime.46 Today there are 14 ongoing sanctions regimes, which focus on 
supporting political settlement of conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. 
Each regime is administered by one committee, which is chaired by a non-permanent member 
                                                   
42 B. Simma (ed) and N. Krisch, supra fn 17, p 753. 
43 The homepage of the United Nations Security Council. – 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information.  
44 See more in T. Biersteker. Types of UN Targeted Sanctions and their Effectiveness: Research Note. 2014. 
45 A. Orakhelashvili, supra fn 3, p 61. 




of the SC. There are 10 monitoring groups, teams and panels that support the work of the 
sanctions committees.47  
 
The sanction committees working mechanism is similar to the SC itself. The sanction 
committees are composed of representatives of the Member States of the SC, they meet in 
closed sessions, and they take decisions by consensus.48 The sanction committees receive and 
examine reports regarding the implementation of sanctions, respond to violations, consider 
requests under admitted exceptions, and report on all these matters to the SC.  49 The primary 
task is listing the addressees of the sanctions. Having special committees to deal with each 
sanctions regime has made it easier to identify and administer whom the targeted persons and 
entities for sanctions should be. Listing is also one of the main sources of disputes as there have 
often been listed people that do not agree with being on this list. In reaction to criticism 
concerning the lack of transparency of targeted sanctions the SC adopted detailed resolutions50 
to develop a procedure concerning the listing of individuals and entities.51 Additionally, to deal 
with the listing problem, the SC has also established the office of an Ombudsman. The primary 
purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman is to deal with requests for de-listing from individuals 
and entities by procedures outlined in an annexe to the resolution.52 
 
The SC sanctions are implemented by the Member State or the Member States to whom they 
are addressed. 53 The DPRK is one of two Member States whom a resolution has been directed 
to. 54 After making a resolution and adopting it, it is vital to co-operate with the Member States 
to fulfil these sanctions, among other things the implementation of the listing rests with the 
Member States concerned and that in doing so the Member States have to respect the rights and 
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standards of the targeted individuals and entities. In implementing this obligation, the Member 
States are guided by the SC, but they act under their responsibility. 55 Therefore the SC remains 
an active supervisor of the fulfilment of these obligations, but the primary responsibility to act 
accordingly lies with the Member States. 
 
As the Member States, therefore, bring the decisions into reality, it is impossible for the UN to 
impose sanctions and collective enforcement measures without the participation of sovereign 
states that therefore could also have some legal control. Some argue that the execution and 
effectiveness depend crucially on the goodwill of the members, which depends, in turn, on their 
conviction of the legality of the SC resolutions. 56 The Member States are not allowed to breach 
international law while implementing these sanctions. 
 
Therefore, the SC has the power to adopt resolutions that are binding on the parties and impose 
different types of sanctions on the addressees. Moreover, the fulfilment of the resolutions is 
carried out in co-operation with the Member States. 
 
2.2. The Resolutions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
It has been previously established that the resolutions are the only type of decisions that will 
influence the actions of both the addressees and the other Member States. Therefore, due to the 
binding nature of the resolutions and the number of resolutions that are adopted and executed 
every year, it is especially necessary to review the legality of resolutions to conclude whether 
they are lawful or not and whether they should bring specific consequences or not to the parties 
that are involved. 
 
This chapter sets out the resolutions adopted against the DPRK regarding the nuclear tests, but 
focusing on the resolutions that were adopted in 2017 and 201857 and state all of the sanctions 
that were imposed with these resolutions. This is necessary in order to further analyse whether 
these Resolutions entail the legal aspects that the ICJ could judicially review and to analyze 
these sanctions and what are the legal issues with them in the next chapter. This subchapter has 
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been divided into two: firstly, the general sanctions and secondly, the targeted sanctions, which 
means sanctions against specific individuals and entities. 
 
The SC has adopted 10 resolutions regarding the nuclear tests the DPRK has carried out. In 
October 2006 the SC passed the first resolution against the DPRK regarding nuclear activity. 
The Resolution 171858 condemned the country’s first nuclear test and imposed sanctions on the 
DPRK, including the supply of heavy weaponry, missile technology and material, and select 
luxury goods. In June 2009 the SC adopts Resolution 187459, which strengthens sanctions 
against the DPRK after the second nuclear explosion. In January 2013 the SC passes Resolution 
208760 condemning the DPRK 2012 satellite launch and proliferation activities. The same year, 
in March the SC passed Resolution 209461 imposing harsher sanctions in response to the 
DPRK’s third nuclear test that took place one month earlier. In March 2016 the SC adopts 
Resolution 227062 condemning the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test and its 2015 submarine-
launched missile test. Sanctions were enhanced, including banning states from supplying 
aviation fuel to the DPRK. The same year, in November the SC passes Resolution 232163 
expanding sanctions after the DPRK’s fifth nuclear test, including a ban on mineral exports 
such as copper and nickel, and the selling of statues and helicopters. 
 
Resolution 234564 and Resolution 240765, which are the first and the last resolutions that have 
been adopted during the last year merely recalled all the previous resolutions and PRSTs against 
the DPRK regarding the nuclear tests issue with determining that proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continues a threat to 
international peace and security. Moreover, it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts to 
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take action regarding this matter and provide a program for work and urged all Member States 
to fully cooperate with the Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1718 and the Panel 
of Experts by supplying information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures 
imposed by the previous resolutions. 
 
The other 4 resolutions, however, adopted in 2017 also refer to the Resolution 171866, but are 
more specific than Resolution 234567 and Resolution 240768 and add some sanctions. Namely, 
they impose specific sanctions on the DPRK in general, but also sanctions on both individuals 
and entities of the DPRK. Therefore, it could be stated that the basis of the new resolutions was 
Resolution 171869 that was adopted in 2006 and some aspects were added to it taking into 
account the resolutions that had been adopted so far, including the new lists of individuals and 
entities that would be sanctioned with these resolutions. The following subchapter gives an 
overview of the sanctions that were imposed on the addressees with these 4 resolutions in order 
to show what type of consequences these binding sanctions could have on the subjects and to 
further analyze them in the next chapter. 
 
2.2.1. General Sanctions 
The general sanctions that were imposed related to the activity in the DPRK were economic 
sanctions that restricted the movement of products that were related to the production of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles. Mainly these products were related to different materials, like 
iron, oil etc. Additionally, there were restrictions regarding the work by the people of the DPRK 
outside the DPRK, movement of luxury goods, ventures with the DPRK entities, trading with 
seafood. 
 
The following subchapter has been divided according to the 4 resolutions that add special 
sanctions to Resolution 171870 and set out the general sanctions that will be imposed on the 
DPRK as a State. 
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The sanctions in Resolution 171871 that were referred to in the Resolutions, were the following: 
8 (a): All of the Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer 
to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or 
aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of: 
(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, 
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, or 
related materiel including spare parts, or items; 
(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, as well as other 
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, which could contribute to 
the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass 
destruction-related programmes; 
(iii) Luxury goods. 
8 (b): The DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs (a) (i) and 
(a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items 
from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether 
or not originating in the territory of the DPRK; 
8 (c): All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or 
from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical 
training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, 
maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above; 
8 (f): In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, and thereby 
preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of 
delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance 
with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, 
cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as 
necessary. 
 
(a) Resolution 2356 (June 2017) 
Resolution 235672 recalled the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of Resolution 171873 as 
modified by subsequent resolutions and did not impose any additional sanctions on the State. 
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(b) Resolution no 2371 (August 2017) 
The sanctions in Resolution 237174 were the following: 
4: Adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of Resolution 171875 and this resolution 
through the designation of additional goods; 
5: Adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of Resolution 232176 through the 
designation of additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, 
and technology; 
6: Prohibit vessels related to the activities regarding the nuclear tests to enter into their 
ports. Additionally, requires Member States to prohibit nationals, persons subject to 
their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction 
from owning, leasing, operating any vessel flagged by the DPRK; 
8: The DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory 
or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron and iron ore, and that all 
Members States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their 
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the 
territory of the DPRK; 
9: The DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly, from its territory or 
by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, seafood (including fish, crustaceans, 
mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms), lead or lead ore, and that all 
States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, 
or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the 
DPRK; 
11: It also limited the number of the DPRK nationals who work in other Member States. 
The Member States are not allowed to exceed the total number of work authorizations 
for the DPRK nationals provided in their jurisdictions unless the Committee approves 
on a case-by-case basis; 
12: It also obligated the Member States to prohibit, by their nationals or in their 
territories, the opening of new joint ventures or cooperative entities with the DPRK 
entities or individuals, or the expansion of existing joint ventures through additional 
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investments, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK, 
unless such joint ventures or cooperative entities have been approved by the Committee 
in advance on case-by-case basis. 
 
(c) Resolution 2375 (September 2017) 
The sanctions in Resolution 237577 were the following: 
4: Adjusts the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 171878 through the 
designation of additional WMD-related dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods, 
and technology. Decides to adjust the measures imposed though the designation of 
additional conventional arms-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and 
technology; 
5: Decides to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of 
resolution 171879 through the designation of additional conventional arms-related items, 
materials, equipment, goods, and technology; 
6: Application of the measures in paragraph 6 of Resolution 237180 on vessels 
transporting prohibited items from the DPRK. Obligates the Member States to inspect 
vessels with the consent of the flag State if they have information that provides 
reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, 
sale, transfer and export has been prohibited with the previous resolutions; 
11: Additionally, all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to 
their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, 
and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or 
from the DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or 
transferred to or from the DPRK. 
14: Additionally, all Member States shall prohibit the direct and indirect supply, sale or 
transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag 
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all refined 
petroleum products and refined petroleum products in the amount of up to 500,000 
barrels until 31 December 2017 and then 2,000,000 barrels. Member States will be 
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notified when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products of the yearly amounts 
have been reached and they must cease supplying etc. Moreover, the supply, selling and 
transfer of crude oil was limited. 
16: The DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory 
or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, textiles (including but not limited 
to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products), and that all Member States 
shall prohibit procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using 
their flag vessels or aircraft. 
17: Member States shall not provide work authorizations for the DPRK nationals in their 
jurisdictions in connection with admission to their territories unless the Committee 
determines on a case-by-case basis that the employment is required for other purposes. 
18: The Member States shall also prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the 
opening, maintenance, and operation of all joint ventures or cooperative entities, new 
and existing, with the DPRK entities or individuals, whether or not acting for on behalf 
of the government of the DPRK, unless also assessed by the Committee on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
(d) Resolution 2397 (December 2017) 
The sanctions in Resolution 239781 were the following: 
4: All Member States shall prohibit the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer to the 
DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, 
pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all 
crude, unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis. This also applies to 
petroleum products. 
6: The DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory 
or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, food and agricultural products, 
machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia, 
wood, and vessels, and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of the 
above-mentioned commodities and products from the DPRK by their nationals, or using 
their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK. 
Also it was clarified that the full sectoral ban on seafood prohibits the DPRK from 
selling or transferring, directly or indirectly, fishing rights, and further decides that for 
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sales of and transactions involving all commodities and products from the DPRK whose 
transfer, supply, or sale by the DPRK are prohibited. 
7: Member States prohibit the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, 
through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, 
pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all 
industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, and iron, steel, and other metals. 
 
2.2.2. Sanctions against Individuals and Entities 
The targeted sanctions that were imposed on people related to the activity in the DPRK were 
travel bans and asset freezes against individuals and asset freezes against entities. The targeted 
individuals were the DPRK’s government officials, military officials, major corporations and 
bank representatives. 
 
The sanctions in Resolution 171882  that were referred to in the Resolutions, were the following: 
8 (d): All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, 
freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are 
on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, 
that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated 
by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support 
for, including through other illicit means, the DPRK’s nuclear-related, other weapons 
of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes, or by persons or 
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that any funds, financial 
assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals 
or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons 
or entities; 
8 (e): All Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit 
through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security 
Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK 
policies in relation to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other 
weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, 
provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state to refuse its own nationals 
entry into its territory. 
                                                   




(a) Resolution 2356 (June 2017) 
Resolution 235683 recalled the same sanctions as in Resolution 171884, but added a new list of 
individuals and entities that will be affected by the sanctions. Namely, there were 12 individuals 
against who travel bans and asset freezes were imposed and 4 entities whose assets were frozen 
with this resolution. 
 
(b) Resolution 2371 (August 2017) 
Resolution 237185 also refers to Resolution 171886 and states that the same measures specified 
in paragraph 8 (d) shall apply to the individuals that are listed in the annex of this resolution. 
 
It imposed travel bans and asset freezes upon 9 people and asset freezes upon 4 entities. 
Additionally, it was stated that the individuals and entities that are associate with the sanctioned, 
should be addressed to these restrictions. 
 
(c) Resolution 2375 (September 2017) 
Resolution 237587 also adds people in the list of the sanctions provided in Resolution 171888. 
Namely, travel ban and asset freeze was imposed on 1 additional person and asset freeze was 
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(d) Resolution 2397 (December 2017) 
Resolution 239789 also poses the same sanctions as in Resolution 171890 upon another 16 
individuals in the form of travel ban and asset freeze. As for the entities, 1 more entities’ assets 
were frozen: the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces (MPAF). 
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3.  LEGAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
The possible grounds of nullity and other legal difficulties with the act or decision are central 
to the concept of judicial review because it sets out the concept and process of appeal. 91  In 
order to carry out a judicial review, there needs to exist legal requirements that the SC has to 
follow when adopting its resolutions and imposing obligations to the Member States. Only then 
it is possible for a court to analyze whether the SC’s action has been either legal or illegal.  
 
There a number of difficulties that could arise from the SC’s resolutions. For example, 
difficulties may raise from the adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII without determining 
the existence of a threat to the peace under Article 39, or where the determination is not at least 
readily inferred from the text of the relevant resolution, or where the determination is not at 
least readily inferred from the text of the relevant resolution, or even where the determination 
that there exists a threat to the peace is questionable.92 
 
Another example of a problematic SC’s conduct would be a case where the SC passes (or keeps 
in force) a binding resolution under Chapter VII which is contrary to the international law.93 
The keeping in force of a sanctions regime that results in inhuman or degrading treatment of 
the population of the target State or of certain individuals may, by analogy, be deemed conduct 
that will give rise to the UN’s responsibility.94 In regard to the P5 power, there could also come 
into question the legality of omissions, not just actions. 
 
There is a conceptual and normative difference between a violation of the SC’s resolution that 
is valid and in force, and a refusal to carry out a SC decision that exceeds its competence, which 
needs to be taken into consideration as well.95 This brings about the question of analyzing 
whether the SC has acted ultra vires. According to the ultra vires doctrine the SC should keep 
itself within the powers vested to it under the Charter. The Member States are legitimators of 
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the UN, ones that should always question whether the measure is in accordance with the Charter 
and thus whether it is (un)lawful.96 It could be argued that an act adopted by a political organ 
of the UN is manifestly ultra vires if it breaches the law or exceeds its powers.97 
 
The promulgation of a decision delegating certain Chapter VII powers to Member States or 
other international organizations in a manner that is in violation of the Charter also constitutes 
conduct that could potentially engage the SC’s international responsibility. The SC has the 
option to also create subsidiary organs as measures to maintain or restore international peace; 
however, the conduct of these subsidiary organs need to be proper as well.98 
 
The first subchapter maps the law and principles that the SC has to follow when carrying out 
its responsibilities in order to analyze in the second subchapter, which are the possible 
infringements or violations of rights or principles that could add up the Resolutions being illegal 
and therefore perhaps null. As judicial review could only be carried out in case there are legal 
requirements to an act or decision, this chapter aims to detect what are the laws and principles 
that the SC has to follow and then analyze what are the potential infringements of these laws 
and principles in the Resolutions. The aim of this analysis is to show whether there are laws 
and principles that the SC has to follow and therefore this would fall in the competence of a 
court and with the example of the Resolutions show whether these could be applied to the 
Resolutions as well. 
 
3.1. Law and Principles that the United Nations Security Council Has To Act in 
Accordance with 
There are two different approaches to whether the SC has to act in accordance with law or not. 
Some authors have concluded that the SC’s function is to maintain international peace and 
security and that places it above the law.99 Others insist however, that the actions of the SC are 
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subject to legal limitations, which have their basis in the Charter as well as in international law 
and it is not above the law.100 
 
However, the Member States have reaffirmed their solemn commitment to the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and justice, and to an 
international order based on the rule of law, which are indispensable foundations for a more 
peaceful, prosperous and just world; also they have recognized that the rule of law applies to 
all States equally, and to international organizations, including the United Nations and its 
principal organs, and that respect for and promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide 
all of their activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions; moreover, they 
recognized that all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State 
itself, are accountable to just, fair and equitable laws and are entitled without any discrimination 
to equal protection of the law101. Moreover, the SC itself emphasized in its Resolution 2178102 
the obligations of Member States to respect obligations under international law and in particular 
human rights law as well as respect for the rule of law rather than its own, the SC’s obligations. 
It stated that “It is safe to state that respect for international law, in particular respect for 
international human rights law as well as rule of law have to play a role concerning initiating, 
deciding on and implementing targeted sanctions.”103 
 
Although the SC is influenced by political aspects, it is established by law and its powers, 
functions, and the degree to which it can take political considerations into account are also 
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determined by law.104 The ICJ confirmed in the Admissions105 case that the political character 
of an organ does not release it from a duty to observe the law, let alone place it above the law. 
If there are states that have to carry out their obligations deriving from the resolutions of the SC 
in accordance with international law, it is not possible that what happens beyond that, including 
in the SC, can invoke international law. Moreover, as far as discretionary powers of the SC are 
concerned it has to be pointed out that to have discretionary powers is not tantamount to being 
beyond law.106 This means that although the SC is regarded as political organ, it still need to 
follow laws. 
 
Although the SC is mostly controlled by political means, there is no ground for conclusion that 
SC is free to completely disregard the Charter and deny the acting under international law. The 
SC must consider all possible rules of international law before using its powers and taking 
measures. However, the further the SC is from enforcement activities the more consideration 
must be given to the international law and principles of justice. The SC is not released from the 
laws and claiming that it operates above the law would surely cause “denying the relevance of 
the law to the governance of world affairs”. 107 
 
There are many different grounds on which a claim, that the resolution of the SC could be 
illegal, could be based on. These grounds include the SC acting ultra vires108, procedural 
irregularities and procedural impropriety in terms of a breach of principles of natural justice, of 
which nemo judex in sua causa109 and audi alteram partem110 are particularly noteworthy;  
included in this general list is the illegality of the resolution in the sense of a breach of a rule of 
international law, including ius cogens, coercion, duress and corruption in the decision-making 
process, abuse of power, lack of good faith, bias, material error and the absence of a statement 
of reasons for the decision.111 This also derives from the concept of rule of law, which includes 
                                                   
104 A. Orakhelashvili. Collective Security, p 23. 
105 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations. Advisory Opinion. ICJ Reports, 1948, 
p 64. 
106 R. Wolfrum, supra fn 4, p 456. 
107 I. Rajčić, supra fn 5, p 110. 
108 Latin phrase, which means acting beyond the powers or authority a person or organization which took it. 
109 Latin phrase for a principle, which means that nobody can judge their own lawsuit, otherwise there would be 
no fair justice. 
110 Latin phrase for a principle, which means that in case there is a dispute the parties have to be heard on equal 
terms. 




accountability of law, fairness in its application, procedural transparency and respect for human 
rights.112 It is argued that the principle of rule of law requires that the exercise of such authority 
by whosoever exercised must be open to some form of judicial or other review and additionally 
the protection of human rights requires a judicial control of the measures in question.113 
 
In Certain Expenses114 it was stated that “There is no possibility of applying the concept of 
voidability to the acts of the United Nations. If an act of an organ of the UN had to be considered 
as an invalid act, such invalidity could constitute only the absolute nullity of the act. In other 
words, there are only two alternatives for the acts of the Organization: either the act is fully 
valid, or it is an absolute nullity, because absolute nullity is the only form in which invalidity 
of an act of the Organization can occur.” The nullity of an act would derive from it being 
unlawful and  therefore, it would not create any obligations to the Member States or the 
addressees. 
 
As the UN Charter is the origin of the UN organization and limits the competence of it, the 
legality and constitutionality of the activities of the SC should mainly be based on interpreting 
the Charter and this is so even though the SC rarely indicates the Charter provision on which it 
has founded its acts.115 Article 24 of the Charter states that the SC shall act in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the UN. The main purposes of all the UN organs are dealt with 
in Article 1 and 2 of the Charter. Although this thesis does not aim to analyse the substance of 
each of the principles in depth, it is important to state them as this is a clear indication what are 
the main principles that the SC has to follow when fulfilling its responsibilities and that have 
to be taken into consideration when evaluating the accordance of the Resolutions with these 
principles. The background and meaning of these principles has been widely discussed in 
jurisprudence.116 
 
The principles named in the Charter are: 
1. maintaining international peace and security; 
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2. developing friendly relations; 
3. achieving international co-operation in solving international problems and 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms; 
4. harmonizing the actions of nations; 
5. sovereign equality of all its Members; 
6. fulfilment of obligations in good faith; 
7. solving international disputes by peaceful means; 
8. refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state; 
9. giving assistance; 
10. ensuring that non-member states act in accordance with these principles; 
11. non-intervention to matters of domestic jurisdiction. 
 
Account also will have to be taken of upon the Charter that they have developed over time and 
that the drafters of the Charter did not anticipate that the SC would direct its sanctions against 
individuals and private entities rather than States.117 
 
Although the Charter is the origin of the SC as it was created with it, there are other aspects that 
the SC has to take into consideration when carrying out its obligations. Additionally, being an 
international organization based on constitution created by the agreement of Member States 
with its institutions would mean that the SC is subject of international law and bound by it.118 
In literature, peremptory rules of international law have been referred to as possible limits for 
SC sanctions.119 The proponents of this view argue that these norms are so important for the 
international community that SC decisions violating them are ab initio null and void. 
 
Although it is possible to disregard ius dispositivum120 if that was the intention of the Member 
States, then ius cogens121 cannot be disregarded and the states cannot derogate from that 
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inherent limitation of any organization’s powers. Not only the peremptory norms are embodied 
in the Charter and they apply to treaty-based organs through the law of treaties, but they also 
have a direct and autonomous effect on decisions of the organs.122 Therefore, among others the 
SC also has to follow these norms. Violation of ius cogens should be regarded as an attempt to 
establish a new legal regime and acts contrary to it as ultra vires, either by express clauses or 
by the manner of exercise of rights and duties. 
 
Although in practice jurists have attempted to classify certain rules, but while there is near-
universal agreement for the existence of the category of ius cogens norms, there is far less 
agreement regarding the actual content of this category. However, examples of ius cogens 
norms include:  
1. prohibition on the use of force; 
2. the law of genocide; 
3. principle of racial non-discrimination; 
4. crimes against humanity; 
5. rules prohibiting trade in slaves or human trafficking.123 
 
Although they might overlap to some extent with the peremptory norms, the SC should still act 
in accordance with human rights law as a part of international law. Promotion and respect for 
human rights is one of the purposes of the UN in general and Article 55 of the Charter proclaims 
the obligation to act in accordance with human rights. 
 
It is also said that the UN is bound by the existing human rights instruments under the principle 
of good faith or finally by considering international human rights to be part of customary 
international law, which is binding upon the UN.124 It has also been argued that human rights 
are binding upon the UN due to the fact that its members are committed.125 Resolution 1456126 
emphasized that States were obliged to ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism 
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comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human 
rights. 
 
With regard to the human rights that need to be followed, the author refers to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which is the most universal document stating human rights. This 
Declaration was proclaimed by the GA in Paris on 10 December 1948 as a common standard 
of achievements for all peoples and all nations.127 The Declaration is not, in itself, a legally 
binding instrument. However, it contains a series of principles and rights that are based on 
human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments that are legally binding – 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, the Declaration was 
adopted by consensus by the GA and therefore represents a very strong commitment by States 
to its implementation.128 There are several human rights that it states and that could apply to the 
the SC. Among others the following human rights could be under the review when it comes to 
the resolutions: 
1. right to remedy by competent tribunal; 
2. right to fair public hearing; 
3. right to free movement in and out of the country; 
4. right to own property; 
5. right to desirable work and to join trade unions; 
6. right to adequate living standard; 
 
These rights and principles that were brought out in this chapter could be reviewed as the 
substantial regulation of the SC’s activities. This meaning that the different principles and rights 
named in this chapter indicate what are the limitations to for the SC in carrying out its 
responsibilities in maintaining and restoring peace. 
 
These requirements do not apply just on deciding, but also applying the resolutions. This means 
that the SC reaffirmed that Member States must ensure that any measure taken to counter 
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international 
human rights law, underscoring that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with effective counter-terrorism 
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measures and noted the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent 
and combat terrorism.129 
 
Therefore, we have established that there could be certain laws and principles that the SC has 
to follow when adopting its resolutions. Although, the traditional view regarding the powers of 
the SC is that the powers are rather unlimited and the only restrictions to it is the number of 
votes every resolution needs to receive and the right to veto, the author of this thesis finds that 
this subchapter showed that there could be certain laws and principles in the international law 
that should be followed even if there are no clear statements that these are additional restrictions 
to the power of the SC. 
 
This approach is reasonable as it secures that the SC acts in accordance with the most important 
values of the Member States that it represents. However, this could also mean that it would be 
adequate to give a court the right to carry out a judicial review whether the SC follows the 
necessary legal requirements in practice as well. 
 
3.2. Analysis About the Accordance of the Resolutions against the DPRK with Law 
and Principles 
As the previous subchapter set out the primary laws and principles that the SC needs to follow, 
this subchapter aims to analyze, which parts of the Resolutions by the SC could cause potential 
disputes and add up to either infringements or violations. In judicial review the validity of an 
measure, policy, or decision, or legislative enactment could before the court. Therefore, this 
analysis is carried out in pursuance of providing an example of the judicial review that could 
be carried out in court over the SC resolutions regarding the legality of the measures taken by 
the SC. 
 
However, it is important to state at this point that although this analysis touches upon the 
possible infringements and violations of laws and principles, the legality of these Resolutions 
will not be exhaustively assessed as this would not be achievable due to the lack of public 
information about the addressees involved in the Resolutions and the exact events that have 
occurred in that matter. 
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This subchapter aims firstly, to show that there could be the legal necessity to have an 
international court that has the power and knowledge to decide whether the SC acts in 
accordance with the necessary rights and principles and secondly, to analyze clear legal aspects 
in the Resolutions that can be assessed by a court and therefore substantially it could be possible 
for a court to have this sort of authority over the SC. 
 
As there are certain legal requirements that the resolutions have to follow, there is a possibility 
to review whether these resolutions are lawful on not. Special emphasis in this subchapter is 
put upon the proportionality of infringement of different rights that should be one of the main 
aspects that the a court should analyze when reviewing these resolutions. There are certain 
ethical difficulties with the resolutions, and the proportionality of infringing different rights and 
balancing it with the SC’s purpose of maintaining and restoring peace and security needs to be 
evaluated. 
 
The principle of proportionality prescribes that all statutes that affect human rights should be 
proportionate or reasonable.130 The analysis of proportionality is made up of three sub-
principles: adequacy, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu. These are the main 
subprinciples will also be analyzed regarding the Resolutions. Firstly, the adequacy, which  
establishes that the measure, which affects a human right, must be suitable to achieve the 
purpose that was sought. Secondly, through necessity it is evaluated if the decision-maker has 
chosen, among the measures capable of obtaining the desired outcome, the one, which is the 
least restrictive of the human rights. And thirdly, if the first two principles have been fulfilled, 
it needs to be determined whether the measure is reasonable stricto sensu, which means that the 
application of the instrument could achieve a given end or the objective should not be 
unreasonable in its reciprocal relationships.131  
 
Moreover, the accordance with the proportionality principle was under the attention in the 
Nicaragua 132 case where the ICJ stated that before examining the concrete measures at hand 
that the parties also agree in holding that whether the response to the attack is lawful depends 
on observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in 
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self-defence. Therefore, the counter measurements for different security problems have to be 
decided in accordance with these principles and therefore, it is relevant to assess this aspect 
further regarding the Resolutions. The following analyses what are the problems that the 
Resolutions have raised and what are the legal assessments regarding them. 
 
When it comes to the problems that have been discussed regarding the Resolutions posed on 
the DPRK, there are 2 main aspects: one regarding the general influence on the country and one 
regarding the influence on the individuals and entities. It is clear that the resolutions have had 
an influence on the country, but not the desired outcome as the government of the DPRK still 
continuously resists to follow the resolutions and end the nuclear tests in the interest of the 
safety of not merely Japan, South Korea and United States of America, which seemed to be the 
main potential targets, but the whole world.133 
 
Firstly, the influence of the general sanctions against the State on the population of the DPRK. 
Rather than having an effect on the sanctioned officials, it is said that the general population of 
the DPRK is bearing the severe consequences in the form of hunger and poverty. The influence 
on the ordinary people has raised the gravest concern in international community.134 
Additionally, the concern has been expressed by the UN expert Tomas Ojea Quintana who is 
the special rapporteur for human rights in North Korea.135 
 
Previously the SC’s strict embargo against commerce with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq 
was also seen a depriving ordinary civilians while doing little to pressure those in power.136 The 
failure of sanctions against the DPRK is due to the fact that Kim Jong-un has made his nuclear 
program a centrepiece of his domestic legitimacy, and so the political costs of agreeing to 
denuclearize have outweighed the economic benefits of doing so. It has been stated that for 
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sanctions to change the DPRK’s behaviour, they must allow leaders on the receiving end to 
save face while acceding to the United States’ demands.137 It has been questioned whether 
economic pressure will actually change the target country’s policies. All governments, even 
autocracies, care to some degree about their people’s livelihoods, as plunging living standards 
can spark political unrest. But in general, it has also been stated that the more politically active 
a target’s population is, the more likely sanctions are to work.138 However, the people of the 
DPRK cannot be politically active and therefore the sanctions do not have an influence that is 
necessary. 
 
The concern about the state of the population in the DPRK raised in the SC itself. The SC has 
stated in its resolutions that the purpose of the Resolutions is not to influence and moreover, 
harm the well-being of the ordinary people. In Resolution 2371139 the SC underlined that 
measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian 
consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK. 
 
In Resolution 2371140 the SC noted the findings of the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance that well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major 
insecurities in food and medical care, including very large number of pregnant and lactating 
women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total 
population suffering from chronic malnutrition. Moreover, in Resolution 2375141 the SC 
reiterated its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to 
and condemned the DPRK or pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the 
welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and emphasized the 
necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of the people 
in the DPRK. 
 
However, as the SC has acknowledged that the proceeds of the DPRK’s trade in sectoral goods, 
including but not limited to coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, textiles, seafood, gold, silver, 
rare earth minerals, and other prohibited metals, as well as the revenue generated from the 
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DPRK workers overseas, among others, contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile programs.142 Therefore, it has continued to tackle the issue with nuclear tests with 
additional resolutions that pose more sanctions on the country. However, these resolutions may 
have led to infringements or even violations of rights of the people of the DPRK and especially 
the addressees. 
 
On the one hand we have the people of the DPRK who have the right to adequate living standard 
and who are negatively influenced by the economic sanctions imposed on the country. On the 
other hand we have the SC who has the authority to take measures in its own discretion to 
restore the security of its Member States. Although the SC has a wide discretion, we established 
in the previous chapter that the SC still has to respect human rights. However, these two sides 
have to be balanced as the infringement of human rights could be justified with the purpose of 
securing the safety of all the other Member States. 
 
The SC has stated that the purpose of its sanctions is to influence the government for them to 
end the nuclear tests. However, the average person in the DPRK will also bear the brunt of the 
sanctions. For instance, restrictions on the minerals trade will directly hit engineers, miners, 
truck drivers, and those serving mining communities.143 The SC has adopted the general 
sanctions against the DPRK, which have influenced the people of having enough work and 
products that would provide the well-being of people and their family in fulfilment of the basic 
human needs like water, food and clothes. It has also been said that the hunger continues to 
stalk much of the land and health care is lamentable.144 As the SC has adopted several 
resolutions the latest round of sanctions has increased the hardships. Choi Ha-young, who is 
the chairman of the Love North Korean Children Charity, has complained: “Currently, due to 
the UN sanctions, people in the lowest class are really impacted.”145 
 
Although the purpose of the measures has not been to influence the ordinary people, it seems 
to have this type of influence. Therefore, there exists an infringement of the right to adequate 
living standard. However, this infringement could be justified. For that, it is necessary to detect 
the proportionality of the measure. The first element for that is the adequacy of the measure, 
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which means that it is suitable for dealing with the problem. It can be stated that usually a 
country puts all of its people first and therefore, the imposed sanctions would be adequate in 
dealing with the problem of the DPRK carrying out the nuclear tests in order to secure the safety 
of the whole world. 
 
However, the time has shown so far that even the most restrictive measures on the DPRK’s 
economy have not ended the nuclear tests. Although there are different security problems that 
the DPRK has dealt with for a much longer period of time, it should still be assessed whether 
the imposed measures are adequate at this point or they bring more harm than benefit. As the 
sanctions have not had any influence on the nuclear tests, but the elite of the DPRK continues 
to live a thriving life and the middle class is suffering, the adequacy of the sanctions could be 
the most problematic aspect regarding the sanctions. 
 
The next infringement of right that would be put under the questions are travel bans, which are 
a common measure for targeted sanctions. Travel bans are applied to individuals who are either 
part of a regime or they are applied more independently. They mean to restrict the efficiency of 
terrorist networking.146 In the Resolutions the SC has imposed travel bans on 38 different 
individuals. Travel bans have been one of the most criticised sanctions as there is a clear 
infringement of rights. If the sanction under analysis is travel bans then the relevant human 
right that is opposed to it is freedom of movement. In case of every single travel ban that has 
been imposed on a person it needs to be analyzed whether the travel ban was proportional or 
not. 
 
All of the travel bans imposed with the Resolutions means that any travelling of the listed 
persons or their family to any of the Member States is prohibited. In order to decide who the 
people are that are not allowed to travel to any other countries, the SC has to carry out a 
thorough investigation regarding these people. They have been listed in case there is a 
connection to the events that have taken place. Therefore, the SC has to carry out this 
investigation with regard to the possible infringement or violation that it may add up to. 
 
In order to carry out this measure the Member States have to effectively co-operate and make 
sure that these people do not have the opportunity to travel to other countries. This means that 
not only the SC may infringe this right with its resolution, but the executing Member State 
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could violate a right when carrying out its obligations under the SC resolutions. Therefore, there 
are many parties to this sanction and possible question under the international law.  
 
Although, the SC has to respect the freedom of movement of every person but opposed to it is 
the international peace and security, which should be balanced. The first element again is the 
adequacy of the measure. Unless the person listed in the resolution does not have anything to 
do with the nuclear tests and is still punished for it, the sanction is adequate to deal with this 
issue. The persons listed are mostly people that have some sort of power and therefore, this 
could have more influence on the government’s actions. This is one of the reasons that the 
targeted sanctions were invented as well – in order to address the people, who are actually 
responsible for the events. 
 
Secondly, is the element of necessity, which means that there are less restrictive measures. As 
the two opposed interests that need to be balanced are the freedom of movement of only a few 
people and the peace of security of the whole world, the second element of proportionality is 
also fulfilled. It is proportional because this measure is not so restrictive to the people. And 
thirdly, is the element of proportionality stricto sensu. This element is fulfilled as well as the 
people do not actually suffer from this measure, but it will create inconvenience, which could 
lead to actual changes in the behaviour of the addressees and as they are more from the elite of 
the DPRK, then it could influence the decisions regarding the nuclear tests. 
 
The next sanction to be analyzed is the freezing of assets of both individuals and entities. One 
of the most common measures of targeted sanctions is the freezing of financial assets. The 
freezing of financial assets is decreed and implemented with a view to denying or depriving 
particular entities (individuals, groups, companies or institutions) of their assets or property so 
as to render their activities impossible or at least more difficult or ineffective. The first decision 
to concentrate on exemptions from financial sanctions, thus ameliorating some of the economic 
consequences of the targeted sanctions was made in 2002. It thus acknowledged that the 
implementation of these sanctions resulted in the infringement of the rights of individuals and 
such sanctions, although justified, must not have totally disproportionate effect. This approach 
prevailed.147 
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The right that we have opposed to the purposes of the SC is the individuals and entities right to 
own property. When people do not have access to their own property they are deprived of this 
right and this could also add up as a violation of a basic human right. However, just like with 
travel bans, this violation could be reasoned and on a very similar basis. It is vital that they are 
not disproportionate and addressed to the correct persons as well. The first element of 
proportionality – adequacy – is fulfilled as this could potentially also influence the people that 
are involved with the nuclear tests. The element of necessity is also fulfilled. Although the 
infringement could be more extensive than with travel bans, because freezing of assets is also 
in connection with the living standard of people, then they are also targeted only to people that 
should have a connection to the activities of the country regarding the nuclear tests. Therefore, 
the important aspect again is that the right people are sanctioned and if so, then the third element 
is also fulfilled. 
 
Additionally, it is important to point out that when the SC has imposed the sanctions, it has 
brought out on some occasions that there are exceptions in some cases regarding the sanctions 
for the purpose of not punishing people that are not involved. The sanctions are often evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis and when someone is deprived of right a Member State could ask an 
assessment from the a Committee of the SC that has been created to deal with the sanctions of 
the SC. For example, in case it is banned to work outside of the DPRK, then it could be 
evaluated by the Committee whether this should be still allowed to some people or not.148 
 
Therefore, the possible rights that have been invoked with the SC Resolutions are right to 
adequate living standard in the sense of the DPRK population in general and freedom of 
movement and right to own property. As there are clear legal aspects to the resolutions of the 
SC, it can be assessed that the third element of judicial review regarding the Resolutions, legal 
difficulties of the resolution149, could be not being in accordance with international law and 
principles. However, as there are certain legal difficulties that may raise, a judicial institution, 
such as the ICJ could evaluate on the basis of the evidence provided to it whether the sanction 
was justified against the person who does not agree with it. 
 
When the ICJ would be also provided with the information about the aspects of imposed an 
asset freeze then it could also analyze the proportionality of this sanction, inter alia whether the 
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person who was imposed with such sanction was the correct and reasoned addressee. Therefore, 
both the individuals and entities would have the opportunity to protect themselves against 
arbitrary action regarding the sanctions. However, although there are fundamental rights and 
freedoms that need to be taken into consideration when making resolutions, it is clear that no 
right is absolute, especially when it comes to security matters. This could be the task of the 
court who has the competence to evaluate the proportionality of human rights and other types 
of principles that are related to it. 
 
However, it is important to address the violation of the right to fair public hearing in order to 
protect one’s rights and have the possibility to peacefully settle a disagreement with the 
protection of human rights. If there are certain rights that need to be followed, it would be 
necessary that there is a court that could assess the situation in case the sanctions have been 
posed upon a person who has, in fact, nothing to do with the events that have initiated the 
adoption of resolutions in the first place. Not having an effective judicial organ that reviews the 
resolutions deprives the addressees from one of the most basic right of having the protection of 
a court against the violations of the person’s rights. 
 
However, it could be concluded that in case of sanctions and their proportionality the targeted 
sanctions are better as they could possibly influence the elite of the DPRK and that could 
possibly have the influence regarding the nuclear tests. From a general assessment that was 
conducted in this subparagraph it could said that the travel bans and asset freezes could be 
proportional in case the addressees have been assessed thoroughly and would not add up to 
unlawful sanctions, unless they are made against people who are not involved. In that case there 
would still exist a need for the people to have a right to exercise their right to fair trial and 
challenge these sanctions. 
 
Also another example for effective targeted sanctions is targeting particular goods in the arms 
embargoes adopted in most targeted sanctions.150 In the Resolutions the ban on the import of 
luxury goods has been issued. Such a ban is meant to target political elite in particular and could 
also have a better effect.151 Additionally, there is no right that particularly protects the people 
to have this type of products. Therefore, there are measures that do not add up to violations of 
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rights, but could still have an influence on a country that is posing threat to international peace 
and security. 
 
These were also the possible grounds of declaring a resolution of the SC null and therefore 
mean that this does not have to followed by either the addressees and also the Member States 






4.  INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS THE TRIBUNAL OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL’S RESOLUTIONS 
 
According to several studies at least 160 of the countries in the world acknowledge some type 
of constitutional supervision in practice or theory.152 This extensive spread could implicate that 
political institutions, inter alia the SC, need to have clear boundaries and mechanisms for 
supervision regarding the legality of the decisions. This increases the trust in political 
institutions through legal certainty and trust.153 It is even stated that judicial review of SC’s 
decisions might strengthen rather than weaken the powers of the SC. In particular, it is said, it 
would make sure that more powerful States would not have excessive influence on the SC 
decision concerned.154 
 
The exercise of the power of the judicial review by a court would contribute to the UN’s 
credibility and would generate a feeling of confidence and trust in the UN’s acts because the 
purposes and objectives of the UN would be safeguarded.155 Judicial review is regarded as 
probably the most important (de)legitimator of the SC’s activities and the question whether SC 
resolutions can be subjected to judicial review by a court remains a crucial importance to the 
constitutional system of the UN.156 
 
According to Article 92 of the Charter, the ICJ is declared to be the principal judicial organ of 
the UN. The ICJ is playing a similar role within the UN to that of the constitutional courts in 
the domestic domain as a guardian of the law applied by providing judicial review of the acts 
of the organization.157 As the SC is one organ of the UN, this could also mean that the ICJ could 
review the acts of the SC. Additionally, according to Article 34 of the Charter, international 
organizations, such as the SC, have the right to ask for an opinion from the ICJ. In addition, the 
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ICJ has the authority to ask international organizations information necessary to solve a dispute. 
Therefore, the ICJ and SC are acting in accordance with each-other in pursuance of the same 
purposes. 
 
Although there are other organizations in the UN that are also part of the collective security 
system, it is clear that because the Charter does not declare any institution to be competent to 
review the legality of the resolutions by the SC and as the principal judicial organ of the UN is 
the ICJ, it is the most relevant organ to have some competence in regard to the judicial review 
over the SC. 
 
However, it is important to note that the Charter does not explicitly give the ICJ the power to 
carry out the judicial review and this needs to be taken into account. The drafters of the Charter 
did not intend to provide for a process of judicial review by the ICJ over the SC.158 Such a 
solution was proposed but not accepted at the time of the Charter’s drafting.159 Additionally, it 
would be somewhat difficult, to not say impossible, to amend the Charter with this type of 
clause. It could be argued that as Member States did not intend to give the SC a competence de 
la competence, when it was created, it is plausible to express a wish that the ICJ engages more 
extensively in the interpretation of the Charter.160 
 
However, this competence has not been explicitly excluded either. There is, in fact, no rule, 
which could prevent the ICJ from dealing with the same proceedings simultaneously with the 
SC and the fact that Article 12 of the Charter that prevents the GA from parallel proceedings 
supports the conclusion that it was not predicted to prevent the ICJ since it would be also 
expressly proclaimed in the Charter.161 
 
Additionally, although there are no powers given to the ICJ to review the resolutions under the 
Charter or the Statute, this question could be approached based on the meaning of judicial 
review. Although the power of judicial review has not been vested in the ICJ, it has been 
expressly given a competence to rule in contentious cases and to give advisory opinions and 
has exercised its power in numerous cases. Consequently, it is deemed that it has a significant 
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power of “incidental judicial review”, especially when judging the legality of the SC’s acts, 
when those are bearing on a case before the ICJ, however implicit it is.  162 
 
The ICJ could possibly review the SC acts for conformity with the “higher” law, that is, the 
Charter law and applicable general international law.163 Although the main objection to this is 
that ICJ and SC are coordinate organs, that is, there is no hierarchy between them, the exercise 
of review by the ICJ would not, however, necessarily render it hierarchically superior to the 
other principal organs. Review is undertaken to test an act’s conformity with “higher law” rather 
than against the subjective opinion of the organ undertaking the review. As such, it is 
conceivable that the ICJ could undertake judicial review of the SC’s acts, even if not explicitly 
so empowered, for conformity with hierarchically superior law.164 
 
But as it is a generally recognized principle of international judicial settlement that a tribunal 
has the power to decide on the existence and extent of its own jurisdiction in respect of any 
dispute brought before it, and such a decision is binding on the parties to that dispute165, this 
could be the case of the SC as well. This chapter aims to analyse what has been stated regarding 
the competence of the ICJ regarding the judicial review over the SC resolutions both by legal 
scholars and in relevant case-law as there has been some form of judicial review exercised by 
courts already. 
 
Most of the judicial review of SC decisions exercised until now has been of an indirect nature 
– considering the implementation rather than the decision itself – and undertaken by national 
courts, the European Court of Justice, regional human rights courts and international criminal 
courts.166 But mainly the ICJ and the ECJ have showed flexibility concerning an indirect review 
of the SC’s resolutions, i.e. reviewing the consequences of a decision in question. Although, in 
the Lockerbie and Namibia case, it was expressly stated that it cannot be accepted that the 
decisions of the SC are inherently politically sensitive determinations, are not suitable for 
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judicial review167 and that Article 39 determinations are final and non-reviewable168. However, 
usually the judicial review has been rejected or avoided by the court early on. 
 
Moreover, the authority of the ICJ may arise by implication if an inter-state legal dispute hinges 
on some action of the SC. This is precisely the situation that arose in the Lockerbie169 cases at 
the ICJ in the 1990s. These cases were initiated by Libya against the UK and the US in response 
to those countries advancing sanctions against Libya through the SC. Libya argued that its 
obligations regarding the bombing suspects were governed by the Montreal Convention on air 
terrorism, and that the US and UK could not lawfully demand something different through the 
SC that what was set out in the Convention. Thus, it argued, UN sanctions were unlawful. As 
the SC could not be named as a party in an ICJ case, Libya instead complained that the UK and 
US were violating obligations owed to Libya under the Montreal Convention by enforcing these 
sanctions. 
 
Although the ICJ did not try a case directly against the SC, lack of power of judicial review was 
not even mentioned by the ICJ as a possible objection to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.170 The 
“jurisdiction” of a court is essentially the power to decide according to law a dispute of a 
particular nature between specific parties. The ICJ has two types of jurisdiction according to 
the Charter: the first is solving disputes between Member States (contentious cases) and the 
second is giving advisory opinions to international organizations upon their request. The 
following subchapters analyse the different elements regarding the jurisdiction in solving legal 
disputes. The aim is to conclude what could be the possible grounds for the ICJ to have this 
type of competence indirectly as it was concluded from the last chapter that there is a need to 
review these resolutions, but stated that there are no clear legal grounds to having this kind of 
power. 
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Therefore, this chapter established that it is believed that the SC does have some limits to its 
control and this could be in the form of judicial review. This was necessary in order to find 
general grounds that the judicial review of the SC’s resolutions in the ICJ do not inflict with the 
basic nature and interest of the UN in general and its Member States. The judicial review is 
supported by both several legal scholars and the ICJ itself. The next chapter, however, implies 
to the actual mechanism of its disputes and analyzes whether the Resolutions fulfil the basic 




5.  DISPUTES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
OVER THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ’S 
RESOLUTIONS 
 
As is was set out in the previous chapter the ICJ has two types of jurisdiction. One of the types 
of the jurisdiction of the ICJ is solving disputes between Members States. This thesis 
concentrates on this type of jurisdiction. This thesis sets aside the second jurisdiction of giving 
advisory opinion to international organizations upon their request. This selection has been made 
due to the interest arising from the Resolutions. The potential need to carry out a legal analysis 
raises from the fact that there have been parties that are sanctioned or influenced by the 
sanctions and they have the interest that the infringement or violation would end and they could 
protect their rights through a court-proceedings where they have challenged a certain resolution 
or part of it. 
 
The following chapter analyses the elements of a dispute in the ICJ. Firstly, it sets out what is 
regulated regarding these disputes and then it parallels the Resolutions to these elements in 
order to conclude whether the elements are fulfilled and if not, then what are the alternatives to 
solve the issues and have the elements fulfilled. There are 3 main elements that will be analyzed 
in the first three subchapters. The forth subchapter concludes what are the most important 
aspects regarding the fulfilment of the elements altogether. This is done in order to conclude 
whether the disputes regarding the SC’s resolutions could fall in the scope of the disputes in the 
ICJ. 
 
5.1. Parties to the Dispute 
The first element is that the parties to the dispute are Member States. Article 34 of the Statute 
sets forth that only States may be parties in cases before the ICJ. Although it is also stated that 
public international organizations have to provide the ICJ with relevant information when 
requested and can also do it on their initiative, this does not constitute them being parties to a 
proceeding. 171 
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There does not exist any other legal basis, which sets forth that there could be any other parties 
to the disputes and there is no case-law that would depart from this element. Therefore, this 
element is one of the most problematic when it comes to reviewing the resolutions of the SC as 
this already presumes that at least one of the parties is the SC. 
 
When we parallel this element with the Resolutions, it is clear that it would have parties that 
are not both States. The potential parties are the SC from the one side and a Member State, an 
individual or an entity from the other side as the latter has the interest to initiate a case against 
the SC for adopting a resolution that allegedly violates the rights of the person. When it comes 
to the targeted sanctions it would mainly be an individual or an entity. However, if there is a 
general interest from the side of the Member State or a Member State has to carry out the 
resolution and finds it violating the rights, then there could come into question the possibility 
of a State being a party from one side as well. 
 
However, this problem could be overcome with the next element of the disputes in the ICJ, 
which is through the consent of the parties that have a dispute and have a common interest to 
solve this dispute peacefully. Although this option has not been provided in the legal documents 
of the UN, this could be an option to be assessed and interpreted through the general idea of the 
next element. 
 
5.2. Consent of the Parties to the Dispute 
The second element is that the parties to the dispute need to have expressed their consent to be 
subject to the ICJ as the ICJ is competent to try cases between the Member States if they refer 
the matter to it. The jurisdiction of the ICJ arises from an international treaty, a special 
agreement between states or ipso facto. In case of ICJ the jurisdiction is in rem, which means 
that it’s the product of the consent of the parties, and exists only to the extent that that consent 
has conferred it.172  
 
In order to solve a dispute in the ICJ, the disputing states have either agreed ad hoc or ante hoc 
to jurisdiction and only due to that they can be regarded as parties before the ICJ. This means 
that the ICJ solves disputes where the parties have mutual agreement regarding the ICJ having 
the jurisdiction to solve their dispute and adopt a decision that will bring consequences to them.  
                                                   




This could be one probable aspect in giving the ICJ the power to solve disputes regarding the 
resolutions of the SC. If the disputing party and the SC both agree that the ICJ will solve the 
matter, then the ICJ could have the competence to do it. Although this possibility is not 
regulated, it could merely be an option to be assessed. 
 
In case there is a clear interest from both of the disputing sides that and the parties both agree 
with solving it in the ICJ, then this could be regarded as mutual agreement, which is separately 
entered into in every case. As usually these matters are of great influence either directly in case 
of a Member State or indirectly through a Member State and the SC itself as well then it would 
be relevant to state that both of the parties should have the same interest and therefore 
concluding a mutual agreement would not be impossible to enter into.  
 
The ICJ itself concluded in US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran173 case that it is for 
the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the UN, to resolve any legal questions that may be in 
issue between the parties to a dispute; moreover, the resolution of such legal questions by the 
ICJ may be an important, sometimes, decisive factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of 
the dispute.174 Therefore, the ICJ would help the parties find a solution that both of the parties 
would benefit from and this would be done in a peaceful manner. 
 
Therefore, through a mutual agreement the ICJ would be given a special jurisdiction to deal 
with issues that arise from the SC’s resolutions. This does not mean that from this point on all 
of the organs and individuals could be parties to a dispute in the ICJ, but the special jurisdiction 
regarding problems about the actions of the SC could only be discussed in the ICJ. This 
moreover eliminates the problem that all the national courts could start taking standings on 
whether they should follow the resolution or not.  
 
It has been analyzed whether there should be other courts who will have this power, but it has 
been stated that it would be wise to give one centralized court the competence to review the 
legality, not every Member States’ national court. The latter could lead to chaos and complete 
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legal and political uncertainty and give an easy excuse to not comply with their obligations 
under the Charter.175 
 
However, it has been also stated that it would be rather difficult to reach to a mutual agreement 
between the parties regarding the sanctions of the SC.176 As this type of agreement has not been 
regulated in the legal documents and this is merely an option to be assessed, then at the moment 
we are still at a point where this type of option does not exist and cannot be exercised by the 
parties. 
 
5.3. Matters of the Dispute 
The third element is that the matters of the dispute fall in the scope of the ICJ. Mainly, the 
legality of actions of the SC can be analyzed in the light of being in accordance with the Charter, 
Rules of Procedure, international law (inter alia human rights law) and ius cogens that were 
analyzed in the second and third chapter. As most of these are legal aspects, it means that the 
judicial review regarding the evaluation of the legality of the SC’s actions could fall in the 
primary purpose of a court. 
 
Article 38 of the Statute states that the function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it. Moreover, according to Article 38 (1) the ICJ applies: 
1. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting countries; 
2. international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law; 
3. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
4. subject to the provisions Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
 
Therefore, it could be stated that the issues that could rise regarding the SC fall in the scope of 
the ICJ according to Article 38. As the SC has to act in accordance with the law and principles 
of international law and the ICJ applies the latter, it is relevant to say that the ICJ is competent 
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to review whether the Resolutions are legal or illegal through evaluating whether they have 
followed the rights and principles and evaluated the proportionality as well. In the example of 
the Resolutions, there are possible international law aspects that the ICJ could reach a 
conclusion. 
 
Additionally, according to the Statute Article 36 (2) the ICJ solves legal disputes regarding the 
following: 
1. the interpretation of a treaty; 
2. any question of international law; 
3. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
4. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.  
 
In case the ICJ has adopted Resolutions, we analyzed that there are clear legal aspects regarding 
whether the Resolutions are in accordance with human rights, principles and other aspects of 
international law. Therefore, the case could fall in the scope of Article 36 (2) of the Charter. As 
the ICJ solves disputes regarding international law and the resolutions create disputes regarding 
international law, whether it has been followed and how to follow it when executing these 
Resolutions, the matters regarding the SC Resolutions are relevant to the type of disputes in the 
ICJ. 
 
However, dealing with a SC resolution in the ICJ could possibly raise questions that concern 
the fact that the SC is a political institution and this has to be taken into account. In regard to 
this aspect, it is important to differentiate legal disputes from political disputes in order to 
declare that this could also be in the competence of the ICJ. One approach is that legal disputes 
seek to interpret or apply certain valid legal norms, but political disputes seek to change the 
valid legal norms.177 Therefore the political disputes stay out of the scope of the ICJ because 
solving these questions does not fall in the methodology of a court.178 However, the fact that 
the SC is a political organ, does not exclude it from the scope. 
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As the ICJ is referred to as the supreme judicial body in the UN system, some have argued that 
because of this characterization, the ICJ should have the right to review the validity of the acts 
of political organs, at least whenever such an act is relevant to a case before the ICJ.179 The 
judicial work of the ICJ is generally quite distinct from the operations of the other principal 
organs; but there have been occasions when it has found itself involved in a matter of which the 
SC has also been seized.180 Despite the fact that neither the Charter nor the Statute refers to the 
power of the ICJ to review the acts of the UN organs, the ICJ has explicitly and in some cases 
implicitly reviewed the acts of the UN political organs as there have been cases where an 
addressee of the resolution has requested the ICJ to take a standing on the adopted resolution 
or imposed sanctions. 
 
5.4. Fulfilment of the Elements of a Dispute 
At the moment the elements of a legal dispute in the ICJ were not fulfilled, especially regarding 
the matter of the disputing parties. However, this could be achieved when the parties explicitly 
agree to solving the dispute in the ICJ as generally the matters in ICJ deal with international 
law and this is the most important aspect as this shows that the ICJ has the competence to 
evaluate the international matters that are in the focal point of the disputes around the 
resolutions of the SC. 
 
The last option is the most likely as the ICJ and SC should work together in harmony to provide 
that the collective security system would bring about the necessary consequences in terms of 
restoring and maintaining the international peace and security. The ICJ shares with the SC, but 
not the GA, the quality of having power to decide, to settle definitively any appropriate issue 
regularly brought before it; and such decision is binding on the parties to the dispute, and on 
them only.181 Even more activist forms of judicial review than have appeared to date may prove 
to be neither utopian nor calamitous, especially if the permanent members of the SC come to 
appreciate that they have long-term interests in pursuing peace through law.182 
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However, there is some relief regarding the people of the EU. In the Kadi183 case the ECJ stated 
that it has no jurisdiction to review the legality of the SC’s resolutions, but it could review the 
EU regulation, which was adopted to effect the obligations of the Member States regarding the 
sanction that the SC ordered – to freeze the assets of Mr Kadi and Mr Al Barakaat due to alleged 
connections to Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida and Taliban. 
 
Although under international law the SC resolutions are superior, under the EU law the 
hierarchy of norms differs and therefore, it was found that the EU regulation can be disputed 
on the basis of infringement of fundamental rights like the right to respect for property, the right 
to be heard before a court of law and the right to effective judicial review. It is within the 
jurisdiction of the courts of member states of the EU to review measures adopted by the 
European Community that give effect to resolutions of the SC. The EC courts have the power 
to review the legality of all Community acts, including the contested regulations that aim to 
give effect to resolutions adopted by the SC under the Charter. A judgment by an EU court that 
an EC measure is not in consonance with a higher rule of law in the EC legal order would not 
implicate a challenge to the legitimacy of that resolution in international law. 
 
However, this does not solve the problem with countries outside of the EU, such as the DPRK 
that was under review regarding the Resolutions. Although the Kadi case revealed that there 
could be measures for the people in the EU, there are no options for the people outside of the 
EU, and in the DPRK for this matter. 
 
In regard to the elements of the judicial review it could be concluded that the forth element 
regarding the Resolutions, tribunal of review184, could indirectly be the ICJ as they deal with 
this type of matters and it does not inflict with any general principles. Moreover, this approach 
is very supported by legal specialists that see the necessity of judicial review. However, this 
should still be clearly regulated in order to have legal basis for it as well. At the moment it does 
not. 
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Additionally, the fifth element regarding the Resolutions, parties to the dispute185, are the SC 
and either a State, an individual or an entity, which inflicts with the Charter as at the moment 
only the states could be the parties and this is not the case with the SC’s resolutions. It is definite 
that in every case regarding the SC’s resolutions, at least one of the parties would be the SC. 
Therefore, the ICJ cannot exercise judicial review over the Resolutions. 
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6.  INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE’S 
DECISIONS 
 
The nature and effect of the ICJ’s decisions is the last element of judicial review and it is dealt 
with in order to map what is the influence of the ICJ in general and to the SC at the moment 
and what could be the nature in case the ICJ is given the authority to carry out the judicial 
review of the SC’s resolutions.  
 
In general, the ICJ can write a judgment in a contentious case, and an opinion in its advisory 
competence.186 The decision made after the proceeding is binding, but the recommendation is 
not binding. The necessary effect of the ICJ’s decision is that it would be binding on the parties, 
both the SC and others. This means that in case the SC has the pressure that it could be 
subjected to a decision by the ICJ, it analyzes and acts more in accordance with prescribed 
international law. 
 
At the moment it is recognized that the ICJ does not have the power to annul a SC’s resolution 
due to the fact that it does not have jurisdiction to analyze the SC’s resolutions. This was also 
concluded in the previous chapter. The ICJ itself stated in the Northern Cameroons187 case that 
the judgments of the ICJ do not have a binding force for the political organs of the UN. Whereas 
courts in many municipal legal systems, especially the superior courts, are empowered by law, 
constitutional or otherwise, to pronounce as invalid and proceed to annul an act adopted by the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the ICJ has does not have such 
powers. 188 
 
When the term “judicial review” is used with specific reference to review of SC action it seems 
to be understood as a process, the outcome of which may be the SC decision being illegal or 
void. For such an outcome to constitute judicial review, it must be binding on the UN and the 
Council. In this sense, there can be no judicial review of SC action by the ICJ.  It has been noted 
that if by the term is meant a constitutional process of judicial review, with compulsory effect, 
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it is clear that no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the UN.189 Indeed even 
the ICJ has accepted as much, not only through its explicit statement in Namibia.190 
 
However, even though it has been stated that if a decision of the ICJ is unable to annul or 
suspend the impugned act, the practical, legal consequences of such a decision may bring about 
effective annulment.191 Thus, where the ICJ find its contentious proceedings that an act of an 
international body is invalid in terms of ultra vires, the act will, of course, continue to exist in 
law in fact because in contentious cases the decision is final and binding only on the litigating 
States, and no other entity, State or otherwise.192  For that very reason, however, the disputing, 
affected State may be heard to argue that act is not any more opposable to it. In short, the act 
will almost certainly be void between the parties, as opposed to being null and void towards 
everyone.193 
 
In case the jurisdiction of the ICJ will be given legal basis for competence, the aspect of the 
nature and consequences of the decision should also be clarified. It is important to set out what 
are the consequences and how severe they can be. What would be the purpose of the court’s 
decision? Whether it is to end the violation of the human rights, provide any damages for the 
loss that the incorrect resolution has generated or to discipline the SC for their actions? 
However, the last element of judicial review, the nature of the decision194, is not binding as the 
ICJ does not have the competence at the moment, but if that problem is solved, then the nature 
could possibly be binding. 
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The SC has been given the power to adopt binding resolutions that impose sanctions on the 
Member States that are not acting in accordance with the international agreements and pose a 
threat to international peace and security. The initial purpose of creating the SC was that it 
would be fairly independent and has wide power in order to carry out its responsibility to restore 
and maintain international peace and security. However, since the creation there have been wide 
discussions by legal scholars regarding international law as the limits of the SC and some 
countries have even tried to dispute a resolution in court. 
 
It has been widely recognized in jurisprudence that the SC’s power could be limited with the 
power of a judicial institution having the competence to review the legality of its resolutions. 
As the decisions of the organs of the SC could influence most of the world, it is necessary that 
an international court would deal with the legality of the resolutions. The closest judicial organ 
for the SC is the ICJ as together they form the collective security system of the UN. However, 
there are no clear legal basis in the documents of the UN that would state that the ICJ will carry 
out a judicial review over the actions taken by the SC. This has been stated by the ICJ as well, 
when a party has wanted to dispute the resolution, but the ICJ refused to analyze the legality 
due to having no legal grounds for this type of competence. 
 
This thesis analyzed from the perspective of the resolutions adopted against the DPRK, whether 
these type of resolutions could possibly be reviewed by the ICJ. As it was confirmed, there are 
no legal grounds for this type of competence as it has been stated in the Statute that only states 
can be parties to a dispute in the ICJ. This turned out to be the main issue regarding the ICJ 
having the competence to review the resolutions. However, this problem could possibly be 
solved with a separate agreement between the parties (e.g. the SC and the addressee of the 
resolution). This problem seems to be the only aspect that clearly excludes the ICJ from dealing 
with the resolutions of the SC. Other aspects of judicial review are fulfilled by interpretation 
and purposes of both of the institutions. However, the option of mutual agreement might be 




More specifically it was firstly analyzed what is the competence of the SC in making 
resolutions. It was concluded that the SC has been given a decision-making power and the most 
influential part of it is issuing binding resolutions that impose different sanctions. This is a 
measure how the SC is allowed to tackle international security problems. However, it was also 
concluded that the SC does not have completely unlimited powers as the basic rules of 
international law apply even to the SC. Firstly, the SC has to act in accordance with the Charter 
and its principles, the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council and the Note by 
the President of the SC. Secondly, the SC has to respect international law (inter alia human 
rights, ius cogens). 
 
Moreover, the analysis established that the sanctions that the SC poses with its resolutions may 
infringe basic human rights, which also means that there is a need to guarantee that people are 
protected from disproportional infringements of rights and that people have a basic right of 
having the opportunity to seek the protection of one’s rights in court. The resolutions against 
the DPRK showed that the possible rights that could be violated are the right to adequate living 
standard, right to own property, freedom of movement and right to fair trial. These are all 
important rights to be protected and it is possible to carry out the proportionality test whether 
the sanctions are proportional or not. This could fall in the competence of an international court 
as the influenced parties could be from anywhere. 
 
It was analyzed whether an international court, such as the ICJ, has the competence to carry out 
this type of judicial review. From the substantive point of the matters that the ICJ deals with, it 
could be stated that the infringements that could take with the resolutions are in the competence 
of the ICJ as the ICJ deals with all types of questions regarding international law and it applies 
laws and principles of international law. From the example of the resolutions against the DPRK 
it was clear that the questions regarding the actions of the SC are questions regarding 
international law as all of the resolutions influence rights in one way or another as their idea is 
to pressure the addressees into acting in a way that would not pose a threat to the peace and 
security of the world. This means that there could be potential violations of international law 
by the SC. 
 
However, it was concluded that in case there is interest to allow the ICJ to decide different 
matters regarding international law, the participants have to overcome the issue of the Statute 
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clearly stating that the parties of the dispute in the ICJ could only be states. The author suggests 
that this problem could be overcome with giving the ICJ a special jurisdiction regarding the 
matters of the SC with a mutual agreement of the parties that are involved. This means that the 
SC and the addressee of the resolution agree on the ICJ on having the competence to decide the 
matter. 
 
Although the author agrees that this is not a conclusive solution as it has not been regulated in 
the UN acts, but could support the interests of all of the parties. Therefore, reaching to a mutual 
agreement is more possible than changing the Charter in order to have legal basis to involve the 
SC to a dispute. Otherwise, it would be rather irrational that although it could be interpreted 
that the ICJ has the competence to deal with the matters of the SC, the disputes cannot be solve 
in the ICJ as the only impediment for this is that the Charter sets forth that only States can be 
parties to a dispute in the ICJ. 
 
Moreover, in case the ICJ would have the competence through this type of agreement, there 
also remains a question what would be the outcome and influence of the court decision on the 
parties involved. This needs to be clarified. At the moment the ICJ cannot issue binding 
decisions regarding the SC resolutions. However, if the ICJ will be given this competence and 
would have the right to adopt a decision that would be binding on the parties, the aspects of a 
court award and what it could state and impose on the SC, for example, should also be taken 
into consideration when the ICJ would start assessing the legality of the SC’s resolutions.  
 
The author agrees with the legal discussions that state that the judicial review in the ICJ over 
the SC’s resolutions would not weaken the authority of the SC, but rather makes it stronger.  
Having a clear recourse how to dispute these resolutions could also attribute to helping solve 
the issues between the Member States in a more peaceful manner and would also show that the 
UN is the forerunner of securing the rights of everyone.195 This does not mean that there could 
not be any infringements if they are reasoned, but in case they have been adopted on grounds 
that are not reasoned, then a person does have the opportunity to protect him or herself from 
the arbitrary actions of the SC. 
                                                   
195 B. Martenczuk. The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from 





In conclusion, the ICJ does not have competence to solve disputes regarding the SC’s 
resolutions and therefore the hypothesis was rejected. However, there are two aspects to this 
conclusion that the author found. Firstly, the only hindrances of the competence are the initial 
purpose and that the Charter states that only States can be parties to a dispute. Secondly, it could 
be interpreted that this issue could be overcome through mutual agreement. When considering 
that there is a need to review the legality of the SC’s resolutions and it is widely supported that 
the SC’s powers are not unlimited, the ICJ could be given special competence to deal with 




RESUME IN ESTONIAN 
ÜRO JULGEOLEKUNÕUKOGU RESOLUTSIOONIDE ÕIGUSLIK KONTROLL 
RAHVUSVAHELISES KOHTUS: PÕHJA-KOREALE MÄÄRATUD 
SANKTSIOONIDE NÄIDE 
 
Käesolev magistritöö tegeles küsimusega kas Rahvusvahelisel kohtul on pädevus, et teostada 
ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsioonide üle õiguslikku kontrolli. Töö probleem seisnes selles, 
et puuduvad selged õiguslikud alused sellise kontrolli teostamiseks, kuid kuna ÜRO võib oma 
tegevusega riivata või lausa rikkuda isikute õigusi ja neil puudub otsene võimalus pöörduda 
kohtu poole, et oma õigustele kaitset saada, esineb vajadus, et oleks kohus, kes saaks teostada 
resolutsioonide õiguspärasuse kontrolli. 
 
Käesolev magistritöö analüüsis antud olukorda võttes aluseks Rüder Wolfrumi raporti ÜRO 
Julgeolekunõukogu õiguslikust järelevalvest Rahvusvahelises kohtus, kuna see on kõige 
hiljutisem dokument antud probleemi kohta, mis koondab ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu ja 
Rahvusvahelise kohtu senise tegevuse antud küsimuse raames ning arendas diskussiooni ja tegi 
järeldused Põhja-Korea suhtes 2017. ja 2018. aastatel tehtud resolutsioonide näitel ehk kasutati 
induktiivset meetodit, Lisaks sellele toetas autor erinevaid lähenemisi Rahvusvahelise kohtu 
pädevusele nii erinevate õigusteoreetikute arvamustega kui ka tuues välja olulisema 
Rahvusvahelise kohtu praktikast. 
 
Magistritöö eesmärk oli välja selgitada, kas analüüsides õigusliku kontrolli elementidest võiks 
Rahvusvahelisel kohtul siiski esineda selline pädevus ning mis on hetkel peamisteks 
takistusteks, et sellist pädevust praktikas järjepidevalt teostada. Töö eesmärk ei olnud sedastada 
kas vastavad resolutsioonid on õiguspärased või mitte. Töö hüpotees oli, et Rahvusvahelisel 
kohtul eksisteerib pädevus teostada õiguspärasuse kontrolli. Seda põhjusel, et territoriaalselt 
katab Rahvusvahline kohus samu alasid, mida Julgeolekunõukogu ning nad kuuluvad ühte 
julgeoleku tagamise süsteemi. 
 
Esimene peatükk käsitles ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu pädevust võtta vastu otsuseid selleks, et 
teha kindlaks kas tal on olemas pädevus teha otsuseid ning mis on selle pädevuse teostamise 
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eesmärk ning sedastas, et Põhja-Korea suhtes tehtud resolutsioonide näol teostas ÜRO temale 
antud võimu. 
 
Teine peatükk käsitles mehhanismi, kuidas resolutsioone vastu võetakse ja milliseid tagajärgi 
need endaga kaasa võivad tuua ning analüüsis Põhja-Korea resolutsioone selles osas, milliseid 
sanktsioone need pooltele kaasa tõid. Järeldusena leidis töö autor, et Julgeolekunõukogu tööd 
reguleerib ÜRO Harta, Julgeolekunõukogu protseduurilised reeglid ja presidendi märkused. 
Vastavalt nendele võtab Julgeolunõukogu vastu resolutsioone, mis on siduva iseloomuga tema 
adressaatidele ja sisaldavad endas mitmeid erinevaid sanktsioone, millel võivad olla ulatuslikud 
tagajärjed. Põhja-Korea resolutsioonide näitel selgus analüüsist, et sanktsioone on väga palju 
erinevat tüüpi ning seega võivad nad tuua ulatuslikke tagajärgi nii riigile kui ka üksikisikutele 
ja ettevõtetele. 
 
Kolmas peatükk käsitles õiguslikke probleeme, mis võivad kaasneda Julgeolekunõukogu 
resolutsioonidega. Esimene pool tõi välja kas ja millised õigusi ja printsiipe peab 
Julgeolekunõukogu järgima ning teine pool analüüsis milliseid nendest õigustest ja 
printsiipidest võivad olla riivatud või rikutud Põhja-Korea resolutsioonide puhul. Käesoleva 
töö analüüsi käigus leidis autor, et ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu peaks järgima rahvusvahelist 
õigust, kuid eelkõige Hartas toodud printsiipe, inimõigusi ja ius cogens’it. See omakorda viis 
autori analüüsini, kas mõni nendest õigustest või printsiipidest võib olla riivatud või rikutud 
Põhja-Korea suhtes tehtud resolutsioonides. Analüüsiti proportsionaalsust ühelt poolt 
Julgeolekunõukogu huvi osas taastada ja tagada maailma julgeolek ning teiselt poolt õigust 
varale, liikumisvabadust, õigust saada kohtulikku kaitset ning õigust inimväärikale elule. Autor 
järeldas, et kuna on olemas õigused ja õigusprintsiibid ning nendele vastavuse küsimus tõusetub 
seoses vastu võetud resolutsioonidega, võiks tulla kõne alla õiguslik järelevalve. 
 
Neljas peatükk käsitles Rahvusvahlise kohtu pädevuse suhtes võetud seisukohti selles osas, kas 
tal võiks olla üldistest rahvusvahelise õiguse printsiipidest tulenevalt pädevust kontrollida 
Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsioonide õiguspärasust. Autor järeldas, et vastava pädevuse suhtes 
on rohkem positiivseid toetuspunkte ja sellist järelevalvet teotavad üldised printsiibid vastava 




Viies peatükk käsitles Rahvusvahelises kohtus lahendatavate vaidluste protseduuri ning 
elemente, mis iseloomustavad asjaolu, kas pooltel on võimalik lahendada omavaheline vaidlus 
Rahvusvahelises kohtus. Vaadeldavaid elemente oli kolm: vaidluste pooled, poolte nõusolek ja 
vaidluste tüüp. Käesoleva töö autor järeldas, et kõige suurem takistus hetkel lahendada 
Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsioonide õiguspärasuse üle vaidlusi on asjaolu, et Harta nimetab, et 
poolteks saavad olla üksnes riigid. Küll aga leidis autor, et juhul kui läheneda vastavas kohtus 
vaidlevate poolte puhul asjaolust, et vajalik on nõusolek, võiks antud probleemi ületada poolte 
ühise nõusolekuga. Kuna aga hetkel pole reguleeritud, et selline võimalus eksisteerib, jääb see 
hetkel siiski takistama Rahvusvahelise kohtu pädevust. 
 
Oluline aspekt, mida autor järeldas vastavast analüüsist, on asjaolu, et kuna Rahvusvaheline 
kohus lahendab küsimusi rahvusvahelise õiguse kohta ja kohaldab rahvusvahelist õigust ning 
selle printsiipe, oleks asjakohane lahendada küsimusi Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsioonide kohta 
just selles kohtus. Kuigi mõningane kaitse on olemas Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigi kodanikel, siis 
see ei taga kolmandate riikide isikute õigusi, kes võivad samuti olla mõjutatud nagu see on ka 
juhul, kui resolutsioon on tehtud Põhja-Korea või selle riigi kodanike suhtes. Seetõttu peaks 
võimalike poolte probleemi siiski ületama igakordse eraldi kokkuleppega ja seega andma selle 
kaudu Rahvusvahelisele kohtule eripädevuse. 
 
Viimane peatükk käsitles küsimust seoses Rahvusvahelise kohtu otsuste mõju, et teha kindlaks, 
millised tagajärjed on Rahvusvahelise kohtu potentsiaalsel otsusel. Autor järeldas, et kuna 
hetkel ei ole Rahvusvahelisel kohtul pädevust, siis ole võimalik siduvaid otsuseid teha. Küll 
aga kui selline pädevust antaks, peaksid kohtuotsused olema pooltele siduvad. Küll aga 
tähendaks see, et oleks vaja selgelt reguleerida ka aspektid, mida Rahvusvaheline kohus saab 
pooltele vaidluse tulemusena määrata. 
 
Kokkuvõttes lükati hüpotees ümber, kuna kuigi Rahvusvaheline kohus lahendab küsimusi, mis 
võiksid tekkida seoses Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsioonidega, takistab pädevuse olemus selge 
klausel Hartas, mis nimetab, et poolteks saavad olla üksnes riigid. Kuna aga vaidlus 
resolutsiooni üle eeldab, et vähemalt üks pool on Julgeolekunõukogu, on välistatud see 
võimalus. Küll aga pole see autori hinnangul ületamatu probleem, kui Rahvusvahelises kohtus 
vaidlemiseks on üks tingimus ka poolte nõusolek ning seda oleks võimalik autori hinnangul 
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saavutada, kuna mõlemad pooled tegutsevad üldiselt selle eesmärgi nimel, et vaidlus saaks 
rahumeelselt lahendatud, siis võiks tõlgendada, et selle kaudu võiks tekkida Rahvusvahelisele 
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